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Abstract. This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differ-
ences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an estab-
lished reputation in the debt market, the entrants’s quality is not yet known in the
debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to
interfere with the “reputation acquisition” of the entrant.
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1 Introduction
The literature on industrial organization contains a host of arguments on the practice
of predation. The most common models are either based on asymmetric or/and
incomplete information in the product market (signalling and reputation models)
or based on some sort of capital market imperfection.
A common feature of the models based on capital market imperfections is that
they stress some difference in the “financial vulnerability” of the incumbent and
the entrant.
A first subset of these models simply assumes that the entrant is financially
constrained while the incumbent is not. This idea was first proposed by Telser
(1966), who argues that predation would not be observed as a consequence of ex-
isting financial constraints. The point is that if the entrant is financially constrained
and the incumbent knows it, it will pay for the incumbent to prey till the entrant
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